The Universal-Wave-Function vs. The Pilot-Schrödinger-Wave-Function vs. the Collapsing-Schrödinger-Wave-function as a Stab at Explaining Reality.
The diversity of possible comments on this book
reflects ironically the Everett paradigm of quantum ontology. There are as many
views of reality as there are observers. Thankfully in all instances, given the
depth of some of the possible interpretations, the interaction of the observer
state wave and that of the rest of the universe is extremely asymmetrical - the
universe has a great effect on the observer but the latter's effect on the
universe is mercifully, infinitesimally small. There is no doubt that the
philosophical implications of the developments in modern scientific thinking
are in lagging mode. This is because of the extreme complexities of the
formalisms created to describe the reality as seen by human observers with a
certain evolved sense of perception. The modern philosopher has to tread wearily
through the theory before emerging tired and almost at wit's end to be in a
position to even expound a valid opinion, least of all an emerging new
philosophy, on the ontological basis of the quantum world. This is the first
time I’ve read a book on Quantum Mechanics wherein three of the major outlier
physicists appear: David Bohm, Hugh Everett III, and John Stewart Bell.
I'm always so frustrated by people who are
absolutely sure of themselves, although I wouldn't doubt that I do the same
kind of thing more often than I'd like. My suspicion is that people can't help
but make probability judgments based only on the information available to them
at a given time. Many, especially those in the scientific community, are quick
to dismiss certain possible viewpoints because they consider them to have an
extraordinarily low probability, therefore requiring "extraordinary"
evidence to be explored at all. Even though I consider myself a
"skeptic" in many ways, I've always doubted this kind of thinking,
which I hear all the time from other skeptics. I'm not sure how to put it into
words, but maybe it's the word "extraordinary" that I object to in
the first place. Wouldn't many modern scientific "facts" and
technologies, for example, be considered "extraordinary" by those in
the past, even the recent past in some cases? This exclusionary model of
(scientific?) thinking seems fundamentally flawed to me, yet on the other hand,
I feel I completely understand why it happens. I believe it's simply a
practical matter of human limitations on focus and scope. Ought we to not focus
on those that have a higher "probability" of being provable and
workable? We seemed to have arrived at some sort of logical paradox here. This
seemed the attitude that Bohr and his accolades had when confronted with ideas
(by Bohm, Everett and Bell) non-aligned with their vision of what was/is real.
Bottom-line: the Alain Aspect experiment leaves
us with ONLY a dual choice in terms of interpreting reality: either (1) a
hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics (as opposed to a wave-function
collapse approach, or whatever) is looking less and less plausible, unless we
are really happy to reject special relativity of course, or, (2) reality is
non-local in the sense that instantaneous action at a distance is possible.
I'm not sure I agree with either; unfortunately
both the theory and the experiments force me to choose one or the other. I
don't think Kant, or anyone else, anticipated this. Bloody hell! In quantum
mechanics, the results of experiments are probabilistic. But no one really
knows how or why. By that I mean, are their properties as we measure them
"real" or are we really measuring some abstraction of an underlying
reality? It would take far too long to go into that here, but there are
proponents on either side of the debate - and even within those sides, there's
very different approaches. One'd probably find most people would say (for
various reasons) that reality is fundamentally probabilistic (there is no
underlying reality - no hidden variables), but it's not actually as pinned down
as its proponents claim. Currently the most common idea is that the world is
fundamentally probabilistic, but one obviously wouldn't' agree with that as a hard
determinist. I think an idea I keep banging on about - not because I think it
is necessarily right, but because I can't argue its ability to circumvent
Bell's Theorem - is super-determinism. So, I don't think complexity can turn a hard deterministic
universe into one that appears probabilistic, at least not at the fundamental
level. But give me a few days and I'll probably change my mind on that. The
thing with hard determinism and free will is that I don't think the two are
compatible. I'm going to do what I'm going to do, irrelevant of any independent
influence from "me". It's a nonsensical statement, even. That doesn't
mean I don't make rational decisions, but what I'm going to do is already
decided. On the other hand, if there is a "me" that can have some
arbitrary influence on my decision making - how is that any more a case of free
will? What instigates that spark of independence, other than some random action
I have no control over? Even with an understanding of complexity, I still think
it all boils down to those arguments of principles. I think. Basically, the
question of free will does both my balls in…
A ham sandwich is better than understanding
what is reality! How do we know that?
1. NOTHING is better than understanding what is
reality -- AND
2. A ham sandwich is BETTER than NOTHING!
Ipso facto; QED!
NB: Becker’s attempt at explaining Bell’s
inequality theorem by using the casino analogy is nothing short of masterful.
Well done Sir!






